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I. INTRODUCTION
In an 8-1 decision in Scott v. Harris,1 the Supreme Court reversed
an Eleventh Circuit decision that had denied qualified immunity to a
police officer sued by a fleeing motorist who was rendered
quadriplegic when his car was pushed over an embankment by the
officer’s vehicle.2 The Court held that the officer did not violate the
motorist’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
3
seizure and that the officer was entitled to summary judgment. Both
the federal district court and the Eleventh Circuit had ruled in favor
of the respondent, denying the officer’s summary judgment motion
based on qualified immunity after finding a Fourth Amendment
violation.4
II. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In March 2001, a Coweta County, Georgia deputy police officer
clocked a car driven by Victor Harris traveling 73 miles per hour in a
55-mile-per-hour zone and flashed his lights to initiate a traffic stop.
Rather than stopping, Mr. Harris fled from the officer, at times driving
5
more than 85 miles per hour on a two-lane road. Upon hearing a
request for help, Officer Timothy Scott joined the pursuit and forced
Harris into a shopping center, where police unsuccessfully attempted
to box him in. After further pursuit, Scott considered engaging a
“Precision Intervention Technique” (“PIT”) maneuver, which ideally
would have caused Harris’s car to spin out, but decided against it.
Instead, Scott applied a push-bumper technique to the rear of Harris’s
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car, which caused Harris to lose control of his car, crash over the
embankment, and suffer severe injuries that rendered him
6
quadriplegic.
Harris sued Scott under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive use of
force resulting in an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.7 Scott moved for summary judgment, claiming qualified
immunity from suit. Scott also asserted that no Fourth Amendment
violation existed because at the time of contact, the law was not
sufficiently clear to put him on notice that his actions were unlawful.8
9
The district court denied Scott’s motion for summary judgment. The
Eleventh Circuit granted an interlocutory appeal and held that Scott
did not have qualified immunity for two reasons: (1) a jury could find
that his actions were unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment; and
(2) the law was clear at the time of the incident that an automobile
could be used as deadly force.10
The Eleventh Circuit said the test established in Tennessee v.
Garner11 was applicable to the case because Scott’s contact constituted
deadly force.12 Under the Garner test, a court is to decide whether the
officer had probable cause to believe that the alleged criminal was
involved in a crime that posed or threatened to pose serious physical
harm, and whether the crime that initiated the chase posed an
13
imminent threat of serious physical harm. The Eleventh Circuit
concluded that Scott’s use of deadly force was impermissible because
these factors were not present, and “deadly force cannot be used in
the absence of the Garner preconditions.”14 In addition, the Eleventh
Circuit determined that Scott should have been on notice that using
deadly force to stop a crime in which there was no imminent threat of

6. Id. at 1773.
7. Harris v. Coweta County, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27348, at *8 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 2003).
8. Id. at *16–18.
9. Id. at *38.
10. Harris v. Coweta County, 433 F.3d 807, 821 (11th Cir. 2005), rev’d 127 S. Ct. 1769
(2007).
11. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
12. Although Garner did not define deadly force, other cases have held that deadly force is
that which is substantially likely to result in death. However, whether the force used was deadly
was not in issue, as Scott admitted, and the court took judicial notice that the force used was
deadly. The Court here did not believe that whether the force was deadly was relevant.
13. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11.
14. Harris, 433 F.3d at 819.
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15
physical harm to the officer or others was unconstitutional. Scott
appealed the decision, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.16

III. HOLDING & RATIONALE
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that Scott’s actions
were not a violation of the Fourth Amendment, and thus that he was
17
entitled to summary judgment. Scalia wrote that courts must
consider a threshold question to resolve qualified immunity issues:
18
whether the alleged facts show a violation of a constitutional right.
Only upon a determination that a constitutional right has been
violated may a court proceed to ask whether the right was clearly
19
established.
The majority began its analysis by endorsing the two-step process
20
for qualified immunity cases that it set forth in Wilson v. Layne. This
test requires that courts first decide whether a constitutional right has
been violated, before deciding whether an officer is entitled to
qualified immunity. In Wilson, the Court unanimously decided that
the Fourth Amendment had been violated when reporters
accompanied federal officers during their execution of search
warrants in individuals’ homes. After establishing that a right had
been violated, the Court then held in an 8-1 decision that the officers
enjoyed qualified immunity.21 The Court in Wilson decided the
constitutional issue, even though the case could have been decided on
a non-constitutional basis by deciding first whether the officers
enjoyed qualified immunity, eliminating the need to reach whether
there was a Fourth Amendment violation.
In determining whether an officer is entitled to qualified
immunity, the Court looks to the officer’s actions and knowledge at
the time of the alleged conduct. In Hope v. Pelzer,22 the Court
determined that case law need not exist with the same facts as the
conduct at issue in order to show that a right was clearly established
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Id. at 820.
Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2006).
Id. at 1779.
Id. at 1774.
Id.
Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999).
Id. at 617–18.
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002).
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23
at law. What mattered was that the officer either was put on notice
or received a fair warning that the conduct at issue was
unconstitutional. Such notice could be established through general
24
principles, not just case law. Whatever the rationale, the Court later
reaffirmed the two-part test in Saucier v. Katz,25 the current test used
in the instant case, which requires: (1) the Court to ask, “[t]aken in the
light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts
alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?”26
(2) If the actions violate a constitutional right, then the Court must
determine “whether the right was clearly established . . . in light of the
specific context of the case.”27
In analyzing the first prong of Wilson—whether a constitutional
right has been violated—there was no dispute that by applying his
bumper to Harris’s vehicle, Officer Scott made a seizure under the
Fourth Amendment.28 Because the touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment is reasonableness, whether a violation occurred depends
on if Officer Scott’s actions were reasonable. The parties agreed that
courts decide whether a seizure using excessive force violated a
defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights under the test set forth in
Graham v. Connor,29 but they disagreed about how to determine
whether an action was objectively reasonable.30
The respondent argued that the issue was not one for the justices
to decide, but rather one for the jury because the lower courts already
determined that, based on Garner, there was enough evidence for a
jury to decide that the officer’s actions were unconstitutional.31 Harris
relied on testimony that evidenced both that Officer Scott was not
adequately trained to execute a PIT maneuver and that it would be
unreasonable to bump a car progressing at a high rate of speed.32

23. Id. at 741.
24. Id.; United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997).
25. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
26. Id. at 201.
27. Id.
28. Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1776 (2006); Brief for Petitioner at 8, Scott v. Harris,
127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007) (No. 15-1631). In Brower v. Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989), the Court
established that use of a police vehicle to deliberately stop a fleeing suspect is a seizure under
the Fourth Amendment.
29. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
30. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1776.
31. Brief for Respondent at 29, Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007) (No. 15-1631).
32. Id. at 8.
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However, only Justice Stevens (in dissent) agreed that the Court
should have let a jury decide whether Officer Scott’s actions were
33
reasonable.
Scott, on the other hand, argued that Garner should not apply
because case law had not clearly established that using a police car to
bump a speeding vehicle constituted deadly force.34 Distinguishing
Garner from his case, Scott maintained that in Garner a gun was used,
a wholesale difference from using a vehicle to bump a fleeing
motorist’s vehicle. An additional distinction is that in Garner, the
fleeing individual was on foot and unarmed, whereas in the instant
case the fleeing individual used a car to escape police.
Aside from these distinguishing facts, Scott contended that the key
question was whether, at the time of contact, the officer reasonably
believed that vehicle contact was needed to avoid a greater harm of
bodily injury or death. Scott urged the Court to use the balancing test
set forth in Graham.35 The Graham test, Scott argued, requires that
reasonableness be gauged by balancing the nature and quality of the
intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the
countervailing governmental interests at stake.36
The Court wholeheartedly adopted Scott’s position. The Court’s
impression of the case is apparent from its phrasing of the issue:
“whether a law enforcement official can, consistent with the Fourth
Amendment, attempt to stop a fleeing motorist from continuing his
public-endangering flight by ramming the motorist’s car from
37
behind.” Stating that the use of deadly force was a non-issue, the
Court concluded that the real issue was whether Scott’s actions were
reasonable.38 Therefore, the Court stated that Garner had no
application to this case, which the Court found bore little resemblance
39
to the facts in Garner. Quoting the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in

33. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1785 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
34. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 28, at 14–15.
35. Id. at 8. The Eleventh Circuit did apply the Graham test; however, its reliance on
Garner led to its conclusion that under Graham, Scott’s actions were not reasonable.
Respondent, likewise, argued that analyzing the case under either Garner or Graham without
the Garner pre-conditions would result in finding of a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Brief for Respondent, supra note 31, at 26.
36. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 28, at 8.
37. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1772 (majority opinion).
38. Id. at 1778.
39. Id. at 1777.
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40
Adams v. St. Lucie County Sheriff’s Department, the Court said that
“‘Garner had nothing to do with one car striking another or even with
car chases in general . . . . A police car’s bumping a fleeing car is, in
fact, not much like a policeman’s shooting a gun so as to hit a
person.’”41 Garner, the Court said, did not provide an “on-off switch”
that could be used to determine the constitutionality of an officer’s
42
actions once a court found that deadly force was used.
Instead, the Court endorsed the Graham test, stating that to
determine the reasonableness of a seizure the Court “‘must balance
the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth
Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental
43
interests alleged to justify the intrusion.’” Perhaps the most
important factor in this balancing test for the Court was that Harris
posed a significant risk to the public and therefore, regardless of
whether bumping the rear of the vehicle constituted deadly force,
Scott’s actions were reasonable.44

IV. IMPACT
Despite the Court’s near unanimous agreement that Officer Scott
was entitled to qualified immunity, there was one element in the case
that was rather unique that might caution against using this decision
to support a mechanical rule heavily favoring police action—the
videotape of the chase. The Court viewed the videotape of the chase
during oral argument and even placed a link to the tape on the
Court’s website next to the decision for the public to view.45 The Court
specifically said that its decision was fairly easy to make, but one
could fairly say the ease with which the Court made its decision was
possible only because of what were unquestionably horrifying scenes
on the videotape.

40. Adams v. St. Lucie County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 962 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir. 1992).
41. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1777 (quoting Adams, 962 F.2d at 1577 (Edmondson, J., dissenting)).
Although the Court quotes the Eleventh Circuit’s decision here, Adams was actually decided
before the Court established its two-part test requiring courts to determine first whether a
constitutional right had been violated. Therefore Adams did not reach the question whether
using a police vehicle to stop a high-speed pursuit violated the Fourth Amendment, and instead
concerned the qualified immunity issue only.
42. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1777.
43. Id. at 1778 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)).
44. Id. at 1778–79.
45. http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/06slipopinion.html.
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In a summary judgment motion, courts are to accept the
46
allegations of fact most sympathetic to the nonmoving party. The
district court and the Eleventh Circuit both found that genuine issues
of material fact existed such that a reasonable juror could conclude
that Officer Scott’s actions were unreasonable in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. However, the Court wrote that where a record
exists that blatantly contradicts the plaintiffs’ version of the facts,
courts should not rely on the plaintiff’s statement.47 Here, the Court
after viewing the videotape, determined that no reasonable juror
48
could believe Harris’s version of the facts.
When both lower courts decided in favor of Harris, arguably only
on the basis of the videotape could the Court conclude no reasonable
juror could find that the “car chase that respondent initiated in this
case posed a substantial and immediate risk of serious physical injury
49
to others.” Therefore, while a clear 8-1 majority signaled that even
the use of deadly force in this case was objectively reasonable, it is not
clear that if evidence such as a videotape is not available lower courts
are to assume a rigid position.
The two concurring opinions state the decision should not be read
as a mechanical, per se rule.50 Importantly, though, no other justices
signed onto these positions. Therefore, for simple ease of
administration, when it can be shown that the public could be
endangered, police officers might have far-ranging license to use even
deadly force without fear of having to defend themselves in a suit for
liability.
Even if the majority opinion does in fact set forth a mechanical
rule to follow in cases in which deadly force is used to terminate highspeed pursuits, the case leaves open the possibility of setting forth a
new test to use in qualified immunity cases. Despite endorsing the
two-step test, the fact that the Court relied on the videotape calls into
question whether the Court will continue to use the two-step process
in deciding qualified immunity cases. In a footnote, the majority noted
that the wisdom of the two-step process requiring consideration of

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986).
Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1776.
Id.
Id. at 1779.
Id. at 1779 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); id. at 1781 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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51
constitutional issues first has been questioned in the past. However,
that issue was not necessarily before the Court to consider, and
furthermore the Court found the constitutional question in this case
52
easy to decide.
Therefore, the majority said the “better approach” in the case was
53
to determine the constitutional question first, in line with precedent.
However, if the constitutional question is not as easy as it was for the
Court to decide here, one reading of the footnote could be that the
better approach would be to decide the qualified immunity issue first
if the immunity issue is easy to decide. The majority’s footnote also
leaves open to interpretation how to determine the better approach in
deciding qualified immunity cases. Could the rule be that when the
constitutional issue is not easy, courts should follow Scott v. Harris and
use the two-step process, but when the qualified immunity issue is
easy, courts should decide that issue first?
Justice Breyer, in his concurrence, explicitly states that Saucier
should be revisited and that lower courts should be able to decide
whichever question provides for the easiest disposition first.54 Justice
Ginsburg, in her concurrence, leaves open the possibility that Saucier
could be revisited when that specific issue is raised properly before
the Court.55 Even so, it is not clear that the Court would take an
opportunity to clarify the issue unless the lower courts signal that the
issue should be clarified. For ease of administration, the lower courts
may very well apply a mechanical rule and avoid causing a split in the
circuits.

V. CONCLUSION
With this decision, the Court endorsed a two-step approach to
resolving qualified immunity cases. However, despite the nearmajority decision, it is not clear that this case stands for a proposition
that police have free license to use deadly force in fleeing felon cases
without consequence. This decision still leaves room for the argument
that unless there is uncontroverted evidence that a fleeing felon poses

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 1774 n.4 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1780 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 1779–80 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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a significant risk of physical harm to the public, deadly force may be
unconstitutional.

